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A CASE STUDY IN FISCAL FEDERALISM: NEW
YORK CITY AND NEW YORK STATE
Carol O'Cldireadin *
Introduction
America's cities are in trouble. It is hard to find any that have not
raised taxes and cut spending in order to balance their budgets in the
past several years.' In part, of course, this crisis has resulted from a
powerful national recession. Nonetheless, the American system of
state and local government finance is seriously flawed and in need of
repair. And in no place is that more obvious than New York City,
which has a permanent structural imbalance between revenues and
expenditures.
This essay argues that much of that imbalance has been imposed on
New York City by other levels of government, and that only these
forces can permanently repair the damage. New York State and New
York City are currently groping toward such a solution with a radical
proposal for a state takeover of Medicaid spending.
The first section of this essay discusses the fiscal relationship among
America's levels of government and outlines the concept of "Fiscal
Federalism." The second section presents the recent experience of
America's cities, and particularly New York City, with Fiscal Feder-
alism. The third section examines the issues involved in changing the
fiscal relationship between New York State and New York City. Fi-
nally, the essay analyzes Governor Cuomo's proposal for a phased-in
takeover of Medicaid spending and asserts that much more needs to
be done to assist our nation's troubled cities in these times of federal
retrenchment.
I. The American Federal Structure Today
The United States Constitution created a federal system of govern-
ment where responsibilities not expressly designated to the central
government belonged to the states. 2 The states subsequently de-
* B.A., M.A., University of Michigan; Ph.D., London School of Economics. The
author is Commissioner of the New York City Department of Finance.
1. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY FISCAL CONDITIONS IN 1991 (July 1991).
According to the National League of Cities, 85% of all U.S. cities either raised existing
taxes or imposed new taxes in 1991. The percentage was even higher for Northeastern
cities - 98%. Id. at iv.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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volved, through "home rule" arrangements, responsibilities to local
governments, such as counties, cities and school districts. As greater
flows of goods, services, people and money have tied the national
economy together, the fiscal arrangements among these levels of gov-
ernment have become both more complicated and less sensible.
For example, the growth of huge urban areas, which everywhere
cross county lines, and in the northeast, where they cross state lines,
mocks rational political and economic decision making. The princi-
pal mechanism for county or city-suburban cooperation is state gov-
ernment, an entity disinterested, at worst, and slow, at best.
Currently, the cities' and counties' power to tax is dependent upon the
states' authority. The only significant tax within the full authority of
local government is the property tax, and even that is levied under
state constitutional limitations and statutory controls, and is often
subject to taxpayer referenda.
Originally, local governments were charged with the responsibility
of providing basic services, such as police, fire, streets and water to
their resident population. Their focus was not to redistribute income
or wealth, nor to compensate for the deficiencies in health care,
schooling and training on a global or rural level. Yet, America's cities
have evolved as providers of services to areas well beyond their bor-
ders, and they continue to play a role in the national economy as we
approach the next century. This was no more evident than in 1989,
when the ten largest United States cities welcomed more than half of
America's immigrants. 3
Cities also play a pivotal role in the nation's private economy,
where they provide work for millions (a large number of whom live
elsewhere), are the home to major employers and serve as the port of
entry for foreign goods and capital, as well as ports of exit for Ameri-
can services and tourists. That role is not reflected in either the distri-
bution of political power or the distribution of resources and
responsibilities of the public economy. This concentration is particu-
larly striking in light of the fact that fully one-third of Americans live
in cities.4
Through the years, ad hoc measures have evolved to recognize the
strains that urbanization has generated for the political institutions
created by a predominantly agrarian Constitutional convention in the
3. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALIZATION SERVICE, 1989 STATIS-
TICAL YEARBOOK OF THE U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALIZATION SERVICE 32-36
(1989).
4. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990
CENSUS PROFILE No. 3 (Sept. 1991).
[Vol. XIX
FISCAL FEDERALISM
18th century. Within the confines of the Tenth Amendment and the
Interstate Commerce Clause,5 the federal government has, in this cen-
tury, instituted a number of innovations which sought to better bal-
ance the fiscal flows with actual economic and political
responsibilities.
One such measure was the introduction of a federal income tax to
provide a basic mechanism for redistributing income from rich to
poor. Both the tax's progressivity and the responsiveness of its reve-
nues to economic growth demonstrated, through time, that the fed-
eral government had a powerful tool, not only to repair some of the
inequality of the private economy, but also to redistribute revenues
within the public sector from the highest level of government to the
lowest.
Economic theory supports the practical view that, with the
broadest and most responsive tax base and an enforcement span from
coast to coast, the national government is in the best position to tax
and to provide public services.6 Despite this leverage on the part of
the federal government, local taxes alone provide purely local serv-
ices. Yet, with a highly mobile population, "purely local" is a shrink-
ing concept. Beyond fire, sanitation and parks, it is not easy to find
services which ultimately do not have "spillover" effects onto non-
residents. The fact that Presidential candidates debate education pol-
icy, which is not a federally provided service, demonstrates that most
Americans feel at risk if any locality is not properly educating its
children.
While the political consensus may be to provide services at the local
level, the economic consensus is that resources are raised most effi-
ciently at the national level. By the early 1970s this arrangement of
responsibility had become known as "Fiscal Federalism." Accepting
constitutionally designated political boundaries, economists set about
rechanneling revenues in order to reach areas where problems were
the most prevalent.7
In the late 1960s, new federal spending created a range of specific
local programs through specific grants. These grants ranged across
several spectrums, including criminal justice, legal services, housing,
community health and education. Nonetheless, this federal funding
came with restrictions and tight controls. By contrast, during the
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
6. RICHARD MUSGRAVE & PEGGY MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 235 (1989).
7. See generally WALLACE OATES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL FEDER-
ALISM (1977).
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Nixon and Ford Administrations, "Fiscal Federalism" became more
general and less categorical in the form of major programs such as
General Revenue Sharing8 (which had a special short-term anti-reces-
sion component during the mid-seventies) and the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act ("CETA").9 Most of the money from
these programs was used to maintain city services, or, ultimately, to
substitute for local revenues.'"
Ronald Reagan heralded his "New Federalism," which was sup-
posed to consolidate federal grants and free other levels of govern-
ment from federally imposed constraints. I I This "New Federalism"
virtually eliminated "Fiscal Federalism." CETA was extinguished in
1982, although the actual death blow to this program was dealt dur-
ing the Carter Administration. General Revenue Sharing finally died
in 1987, after a long strangulation. While the hallmark of the "New
Federalism" was the shift of enforcement responsibility to the states,
the result has been simply fewer dollars without any alternative relief.
Because Reagan's "New Federalism" came at the same time as a mas-
sive cut in personal and business income taxes and a subsequent cur-
tailing of their progressivity, the "revenue" in "revenue sharing" no
longer existed. In effect, the substitution of the "New Federalism" for
"Fiscal Federalism" moved state and local governments from revenue
sharing to deficit sharing.
II. The Impact of Changing "Fiscal Federalism"
on America's Cities
According to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, federal aid to state
and local governments fell by $34 billion in real terms during the
1980s. 12 In addition, spending for key "urban" programs, such as
community development, employment and mass transit fell by sev-
enty-two percent between 1979 and 1989.1
8. J. RICHARD ARONSON & JOHN L. HILLEY, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 117-37 (1986).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 801 (repealed, 1982).
10. For a more detailed history of the federal grant system, see James A. Krauskopf,
Federal Aid, in SETTING MUNICIPAL PRIORITIES 1990 (Charles Brecher & Raymond D.
Horton eds., 1989). See also ARONSON & HILLEY, supra note 8, at 48-74.
11. See generally TIMOTHY CONLAN, NEW FEDERALISM: INTERGOVERNMENTAL
REFORM FROM NIXON To REAGAN (1988).
12. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE
CITIES, A REVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1989, at vi (Feb.
1988).
13. Federal aid to state and local governments declined from $46.69 billion in FY80
(adjusted for inflation) to $13.14 in FY91. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, THE FED-
ERAL BUDGET AND THE CITIES, A REVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET FOR FISCAL
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At the same time, federal taxes became less progressive. Following
the federal income tax changes of 1986,14 which broadened the defini-
tion of income, and thus the tax base, states and cities with progres-
sive income taxes adjusted their tax rates in order to avoid a
"windfall" increase in revenues that would have resulted from the
federal changes. It appears now that the "windfall" was grossly over-
estimated and/or never materialized. As a result, state and local tax
revenues have suffered immensely.15 While these state and local gov-
ernments were erroneously paring back their income taxes, their abil-
ity to raise sales taxes was seriously restricted by the elimination of
federal deductibility. Also, their borrowing costs were raised through
federal restrictions on the use of tax-exempt bonds.
Further, state and local governments bear the "mandate" burden
on their tax bases alone. "Mandates" are the list of federal require-
ments, qualifications, prohibitions, specifications, constraints and con-
trols on specific types of state and local spending. Originally, many of
these mandates were attached to federal aid, and many remain at-
tached by states to their localities. Their elimination would not di-
rectly impact the federal budget, but it would eliminate much
uniformity.
In New York City, federal aid has been crucial over the past two
decades. It was used during the city's fiscal crisis of the mid- to late
1970s to fund basic city services, including police and fire protection.
By the time of Ronald Reagan's inauguration, when the federal com-
mitment to state and local government had already peaked, one out of
every five dollars New York City raised came from the federal
government.
Ten years later, at the time of David Dinkins' inauguration as the
city's first African-American Mayor, only one dollar out of ten that
New York City raised came from the federal government.' 6 The cu-
mulative loss of federal aid to New York City over the decade has
been $25.2 billion.17 That, of course, was not the only change. Dur-
ing those ten years, the income of the top one percent of Americans
YEAR 1989 vi (Feb. 1988); Ten-year Analysis of Selected Key Urban Programs, 57 U.S.
MAYOR 8, 8 (1990).
14. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
15. See Steven Gold & Robert Aten, Where's the Corporate Tax Windfall?, 45 TAX
NOTES 107 (1989). See also Steven Gold, Did the Windfall Stay or Blow Away?, 46 TAX
NOTES 1595 (1990).
16. CITY OF NEW YORK OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE
BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 1991: MESSAGE OF THE MAYOR 87 (1990).
17. NEW YORK CITY FEDERAL AFFAIRS OFFICE, LOSS OF FEDERAL AID TO NEW
YORK CITY SINCE 1981 (1991).
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rose nearly eighty percent, while the income of the poorest twenty
percent of Americans fell by seven percent.18 The federal govern-
ment's budget priorities shifted from spending seven dollars on the
military for every dollar spent on housing to now spending twenty-
seven dollars on the military for every dollar spent on housing. 19
New York City and New York State have worked to replace much,
although not all, of the federal aid that was cut, with the city provid-
ing roughly two-thirds of the replaced funds. In the 1980s, the city's
booming financial and real estate economy in addition to considerable
borrowing made the replacement of federal revenues possible. In this
current recession, that option has now ended.
Nonetheless, if the federal government were today providing the
level of aid to New York City that it provided when Ronald Reagan
took office, the city would have about $2.6 billion more revenue in
this fiscal year. That is enough money to fund the entire police, hous-
ing, health, aging and youth services departments combined. The op-
portunity cost of the "New Federalism" in New York City is reflected
in the rising infant mortality rate, overflowing hospital emergency
rooms, seven month waiting lists for drug treatment and the doubling
up of families throughout the public housing system.
This situation is not improving under the Bush Administration.
Among other things, the 1990 federal budget agreement capped do-
mestic spending for the next five years; set limits on the deductibility
of all state and local taxes from federal taxes; encroached on tradi-
tional state and local revenue sources by raising tobacco and alcohol
taxes; raised gasoline taxes while diverting some of those receipts
from highways; and mandated social security payroll taxes for state
and local government workers.2°
As the federal government remains hamstrung by its deficit reduc-
tion and budget agreement, all levels of government recognize this
truth: while we have a multi-layered system, there is, ultimately, only
one layer of taxpayers. If the federal government will not meet its
responsibilities, there might be a "second-best" solution developing in
New York.
18. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT
PROGRAM, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 1293, 1306 (Comm. Print 1991).
19. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1983, at 30, 37 (1982); THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 4, 10 (1991).
20. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(1990).
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III. Restructuring the Fiscal Relationship Between New York
State and New York City
Because of its constitutional preeminence, New York State has the
ultimate responsibility for ensuring the freedom, quality of life and a
measure of justice for all of New York City's residents. 21 The state
exercises this responsibility in a number of ways - through the pas-
sage of laws, the operation of the courts, the regulation of commerce
and industry, the raising and expenditure of public funds and the
granting of taxing, spending and legislative authority to the city.
As a legal "creature" of the state, the city has a complex web of
legal and fiscal relationships with the state. The state controls all city
taxes, charging a fee to administer the income and sales taxes, and
setting the rules for the property tax. The state provides funding for
elementary and secondary education through a formula set each year.
Much of city spending on education, criminal justice, health care and
welfare services must meet state standards and is subject to fiscal pen-
alties and sanctions if standards are violated. Aside from this political
relationship, the state is strongly related to the city through the econ-
omy. Half of state tax revenues come from economic activity gener-
ated within the city; and forty percent of the state's jobs are located in
the city. 22
These economic realities, as well as its constitutional responsibility,
led the state to provide assistance to New York City during the fiscal
crisis of the 1970s. The state took over a number of functions for-
merly funded by the city, such as the courts and senior colleges of the
City University system. The state created a number of agencies to
provide access to credit markets and financial oversight and assist-
ance, such as the Municipal Assistance Corporation 23 and the Finan-
cial Control Board.24
Despite these new forms of assistance, New York State continues to
impose fiscal burdens on the city that are imposed in very few other
states. These burdens are imposed primarily on major redistributive
programs. New York is one of only thirteen states that requires lo-
21. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. This section states, "The aid, care and support of
the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdi-
visions, and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may ... determine."
Id.
22. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STA-
TISTICS, EMPLOYMENT REVIEW 2 (Dec. 1991).
23. N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW art. 10 (Consol. 1992) (New York State Municipal
Assistance Corporation Act).
24. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW ch. 22 (Consol. 1992) (New York State Financial Emer-
gency Act for The City of New York).
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calities to pay a share of Medicaid costs and its fifty percent local
share is far higher than that required by practically all of these states.
The city's contribution to Medicaid costs were $1.6 billion in fiscal
year ("FY") 91, a cost it would not have to bear if it were in any of
thirty-seven other states. Further, New York is also one of only ten
states that requires localities to pay a share of welfare costs, and once
again, the fifty percent share is the highest of any state. This annual
cost to New York City is $730 million.25
To fund these and other costs, New York State has granted New
York City an unusual amount of local taxing power. As Figures 1
and 2 in Appendix A illustrate, the city has a budget of almost thirty
billion dollars. Its tax revenues make it America's fourth largest tax-
ing jurisdiction, larger than all states except California and New
York. Not surprisingly, New York City's tax structure resembles that
of states more than that of American cities.
New York State, on the other hand, has the lowest ratio of state
taxes to local taxes of any state in America except for New Hamp-
shire - only ninety-four cents for every dollar of local taxes.26 While
New York State has a large budget, much of the state revenue is
raised in New York City, including a number of taxes where more
than seventy-five percent of the total revenue comes directly from ac-
tivity in New York City.27
In the best economic and fiscal times, it is perhaps possible for a
city like New York to accommodate the relatively high tax effort and
spending levels necessitated by the state's fiscal policies. However,
New York City is home to two-thirds of the state's poor people, and
the local spending needs - public assistance, criminal justice, health
care, special education - which this population generates are signifi-
cant. Combined with the decade of reductions in federal aid discussed
above and the prospects for little or no growth in the city economy,
these fiscal burdens are no longer sustainable. The bulk of the pro-
jected gaps in New York City's budget now and into the future are
due to, these redistributive burdens. For example, in FY 1992, com-
bined city Medicaid and income support costs of $2.3 billion plus the
25. ELIZABETH A. ROISTACHER, THE GREAT NEW YORK SWAPSTAKES: OPTIONS
FOR STATE ASSUMPTION OF MEDICAID COSTS 3 (1991). See also CITY OF NEW YORK,
EXECUTIVE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 149-150 (1992).
26. UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 1991, at 160, 172 (1991).
27. Even in New York State's FY 1991, during a recession, New York City contrib-
uted $492 million (82 %) of the $597 million the state collected from the New York State
Hotel Occupancy Tax, the Banking Corporation Tax and the Real Property Gains Tax.
In boom years, these dollars were considerably greater.
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1992 value of Reagan-era federal aid cuts of $2.6 billion exceeded the
$3.5 billion FY 1992 budget gap by $1.4 billion.
This discrepency came as no surprise. Since the 1960s when Medi-
caid and welfare programs were born, commissions have predicted
that their burden would be unsustainable for New York City. In
1971, the New York City Commission on State-City Relations,
chaired by William J. van den Heuvel, and comprised of future digni-
taries such as Mario Cuomo, reviewed the work of previous task
forces on New York City finances and concluded that the state's fail-
ure to assume these burdens was the primary cause of the city's
chronic budget difficulties. 2 The Commission noted:
New York State has too frequently acted like a philanthropic foun-
dation rather than a state. The State has failed to assume the re-
sponsibility which its own sovereignty implies and has proven
unwilling to confront problems which it, through its constitutional
powers of taxation, has the fiscal capacity to solve....29
Now, however, a change is in the works. A bold new idea has been
proposed by now Governor Mario Cuomo. In this plan, Governor
Cuomo seeks to relieve New York City of some of its financial and
service burdens in order to allow it to achieve a new and necessary
degree of financial stability.
IV. Fiscal Federalism in New York State and Governor Cuomo's
Medicaid Takeover Proposal
The size of the burdens borne by New York City raise serious ques-
tions about whether the current fiscal relationship is economically
sustainable for both the city and state, and whether the relationship is
consistent with the duty of the state to provide equal protection to all
of its citizens, which is the goal of a fair and just society. The obvious
questions raised by the present relationship are:
(1) What mix of spending and taxing authority is most consistent
with the state's constitutional responsibilities and the economic in-
terests of both the state and city?
(2) What are the economic and social consequences of the existing
fiscal relationship?
(3) Are there state spending requirements which should be re-
duced or eliminated and how should such reductions be financed?
(4) What are the constitutional, legal and political changes neces-
28. NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON STATE-CITY RELATIONS, A STUDY OF THE
STUDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE WORK AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF A GENERATION OF
TASK FORCES ON NEW YORK CITY'S FISCAL CRISES 29-31 (Dec. 1971).
29. Id. at 31.
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sary in order to restructure the fiscal relationship between the state
and city?
(5) What is a realistic timetable to make this happen?
Since May 1991, both New York City and New York State have
been trying to answer these questions and fashion a workable new
"Fiscal Federalism". The result tells us much about how politics
shapes attempts to restructure fiscal relationships.
A. The Medicaid Takeover Proposal
In September 1991, Governor Cuomo announced a proposal for a
phased takeover of local Medicaid costs, stating:
[I]n one bold step, we can dramatically improve the affordability of
quality public health care and relieve local governments and prop-
erty taxpayers of the most significant burden imposed upon them
by the State of New York."3
Table 1 provides a capsule summary of the Governor's complex
proposal for an eight-year phased-in state take over of Medicaid
spending from localities. The Governor has proposed several stages
in the take-over:
1. Stage One: SFY 1993 & 1994
(1) The state implements a series of "cost containment" measures
leading to state and local savings and bringing down the growth
rate of Medicaid spending in later years.
(2) The state also examines how and when it will take over the
administration of Medicaid.
2. Stage Two: SFY 1993-1997
(1) The state picks up a larger share of the costs of Medicaid recip-
ients enrolled in managed care (i.e. HMO-type) programs. 31
(2) In SFY 1995 the state picks up one hundred percent of local
administrative costs of Medicaid.32
30. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, STATE TAKEOVER
OF LOCAL MEDICAID COSTS: A MANDATE RELIEF PROPOSAL (Sept. 1991) [hereinafter
GOVERNOR'S RELIEF PROPOSAL].
31. Current state law already requires local governments to enroll up to half of all
their Medicaid eligibles by 1997. This part of the proposal is clearly meant to provide the
financial incentive for localities to meet this recently mandated requirement.
32. See GOVERNOR'S RELIEF PROPOSAL, supra note 30, at Table 4. Administrative
costs are estimated to represent approximately 2.7% of total costs in SFY 1993.
[Vol. XIX
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3. Stage Three. SFY 1997-2000
(1) The state incrementally assumes the remaining local share of
Medicaid spending.
To help the state pay for the takeover, New York City incre-
mentally gives up its personal income tax revenues, beginning at sev-
enty-five percent in SFY 1997 and culminating in one hundred
percent in SFY 2000. Other localities give up .85 percentage points of
their sales tax rate in SFY 1998 and a full percentage point in and
after SFY 1999.
Table 1
Summary of the Governor's State Assumption Plan
Cost Percent Assumption
Containment Percent Percent of Local Revenues Percent
as a percent Assumption Assumption Assumption
of Total of Local of Managed All Other of Remaining
SFY Expenditures(a) Administration(b) Care NYC PIT Counties Expenditures
1993 2% - - - -
1994 4% - 50% - - -
1995 4% 100% 70% - - -
1996 4% 100% 70% - - -
1997 4% 100% 100% 75% 0.85 pt (c) 80%
1998 4% 100% 100% 80% 0.85 pt (c) 80%
1999 4% 100% 100% 90% 1.00 pt (c) 90%
2000 4% 100% 100% 100% 1.00 pt (c) 100%
Notes: (a) Percentages are approximate. State plan is not based on precise 4 percent reduction.
The $150 million cost containment program in fiscal year 1994 averages approximately 4
percent in that year and in all subsequent years.
(b) Administration of managed care would remain with localities until after fiscal year
2000.
(c) pt designates percentage point.
Source: ELIZABETH A. ROISTACHER, THE GREAT NEW YORK SWAPSTAKES: OPTIONS FOR
STATE AssuMPTION OF MEDICAID COSTS, (1991).
Table 2 summarizes the state's estimates of the total savings to
localities under the Governor's plan: more than $5 billion over eight
years. Annual savings by the year 2000 are estimated to be in excess
of $1.6 billion.
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Table 2
Financial Gain to Localities Under
Governor's Medicaid Takeover Plan
($ Millions)
Total Svaings Less
From Takeover Revenue Net Gain To
SFY and Cost Cutting Swap Localities
1993 $ 82 - $ 82
1994 202 - 202
1995 365 - 365
1996 486 - 486
1997 4,086 $3,556 530
1998 4,671 3,973 698
1999 5,770 4,732 1,038
2000 7,039 5,434 1,605
Source: OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, STATE TAKEOVER OF LOCAL
MEDICAID CosTS: A MANDATE RELIEF PROPOSAL, Table 4 (Sept. 1991).
Localities save in two ways under this plan. First, in the short- to
mid-term, they derive the benefits of Medicaid cost containment as
quickly as it can be realized, and only so long as they continue to bear
a share of spending. Second, in the longer run they save the net
difference between Medicaid spending and tax revenues. By giving up
revenues that grow more slowly than Medicaid, local governments
lose the major source of their present and future deficits. The value of
the savings equals the dollar difference between the revenue and
Medicaid growth rates.33
While all counties would benefit, as Table 3 shows, New York City
receives the bulk of the savings. This is the result of the fact that the
city is home to two-thirds of the state's Medicaid eligibles. The state
estimates that New York City will save approximately $3.25 billion
by SFY 2000 and $1 billion annually once the program is fully phased
in.
33. The state estimates a Medicaid growth rate of approximately 12% annually, while
in most cases the local tax revenues being given over to the state are estimated to grow at
5-6 % annually.
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Table 3
Net Financial Gain to New York City and
Other Counties
($ Millions)
SFY NYC Counties Total
1993 $ 57 $ 25 $ 82
1994 142 60 202
1995 252 113 365
1996 336 150 486
1997 336 194 530
1998 424 274 698
1999 678 360 1,038
2000 1,037 568 1,605
Source: OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, STATE TAKEOVER OF LOCAL
MEDICAID COSTS: A MANDATE RELIEF PROPOSAL, Tables 1,3,4 (Sept. 1991).
B. Analysis of the Takeover Plan
Stages I and II of the Governor's proposal - cost containment and
managed care - raise a number of health policy questions, such as
how to cut costs without drastically reducing access to care and
whether there will be enough primary care physicians for the man-
aged care program. The administrative takeover proposal raises ques-
tions regarding the impact on local Medicaid workers and the ability
of the state to run a program it has never run before. While these are
major public policy issues, they are not the focus of this essay and will
not be addressed here.
The key question here is to what extent does the Governor's propo-
sal represent "Fiscal Federalism": funding the costs of redistribution
from the rich to the poor through the widest, broadest and fairest tax
base possible?
Unfortunately, the answer is "not very much."
Currently, New York City pays about seventy-four percent of local
Medicaid costs in New York State. Since city residents pay about
thirty-five percent of state taxes, the city could be expected to pay
approximately thirty-five percent of Medicaid costs if they were fi-
nanced statewide. The Governor's plan would shift approximately
twenty percent of the city's Medicaid costs to the statewide tax base,
dropping the share of local Medicaid costs paid by city residents to
roughly sixty percent, still way above the thirty-five percent
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
benchmark. a4
"Fiscal Federalism" involves more than economics; politics are
crucial to making it happen. As such, there are special political
problems involved in a state takeover of Medicaid and/or welfare.3 5
These are major redistributive programs and, therefore, any shift to
the statewide tax base carries important distributional consequences.
Many parts of the state, particularly wealthy suburban counties, pay
less than their fair share of Medicaid costs. They have done so since
the beginning of these programs and, until now, had expected to con-
tinue to do so. Since city representatives account for only forty per-
cent of both houses of the state legislature, any proposal for a state
takeover must be crafted to win support from legislators elected from
other areas.
The Governor made the political assumptions underlying his pro-
posal clear when he released it. He acknowledged that "the reality of
the state's fiscal condition makes a simple takeover of Medicaid im-
possible without either inordinately increasing taxes or imposing over-
whelming cuts in other programs."a 6Given the unattractiveness of
either option, Governor Cuomo's fiscal imperative became using the
local tax base to pay for the bulk of the program and employing cost
containment as both a financing source and a political carrot to
Republicans in both houses.
Can the state not "afford" a takeover? The answer depends on how
one defines the "state." The Governor defines it as the existing
budget of the State of New York; and with a looming $4 billion
budget gap, the state budget cannot easily accommodate nearly $3
billion of new spending. However, if one defines the "state" as the
sum of all of its governments, local jurisdictions included, the answer
is that it is not unaffordable. Viewed from this perspective, a takeover
is not solely a budget issue. It is an issue of redistributing spending
and taxing burdens with no net enlarging of the size of New York
State's public sector.
Let me illustrate how this could work.
34. Roistacher, supra note 25, at 26, 28. See also GOVERNOR'S RELIEF PROPOSAL,
supra note 30, at Tables 1, 4.
35. Welfare programs in New York and most other states are designed to supplement
the incomes of (usually) very poor households. These supplements are either unrestricted
cash grants or payments for specific goods, such as food, heating or shelter. The major
welfare programs in New York are Aid to Families with Children (New York State's
version of the federally-mandated Aid to Families with Dependent Children program),
Food Stamps (which is 100% federally funded), Home Relief and the Low Income Home
Energy Assistance Program.
36. GOVERNOR'S RELIEF PROPOSAL, supra note 30, at 2.
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In May and November of 1991 the Citizen's Budget Commission
proposed a "tax swap" where the state would take over both local
Medicaid and welfare costs, paid for by an increase in the state Per-
sonal Income Tax ("PIT").37 In exchange, localities would cut their
own (property or sales) taxes by an amount equal to their savings.
Total Medicaid and welfare spending would not increase; nor would
total taxes collected statewide. But the distribution of these burdens
around the state would change dramatically. Residents of counties
with high incomes and small poverty populations would pay more;
residents of counties with the opposite characteristics would pay less.
In a Medicaid-only takeover, analysts estimate that "winner" coun-
ties (those whose local tax cuts would be greater than their additional
state PIT payments) account for only forty-four percent of the state
population, nearly all of which is New York City. 8 Unfortunately, it
is hard to imagine enough votes for a winning coalition in the State
Legislature for such a solution.39
But, if there are enough "winner" counties - where the Medicaid
and/or welfare spending exceeds the share of net new taxes they
would have to bear from a tax swap - to generate a majority of legis-
lators, then we can assume that "Fiscal Federalism" is politically fea-
sible in New York.
This author constructed a number of takeover scenarios to test
them against this standard. And, as Table 4 demonstrates, it is possi-
ble to develop a takeover proposal that could be passed by the State
Legislature and also satisfy our definition of "Fiscal Federalism", i.e.
effective redistribution. Table 4 contains five scenarios where the state
takes over either Medicaid or public assistance, at varying takeover
percentages, and does not have to raise the state income tax rates
above the levels of the mid-1980s.
37. CITIZEN'S BUDGET COMMISSION, THE FISCAL PROBLEMS OF THE Two NEW
YORKS: SIZE, NATURE AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS (May 1991).
38. Roistacher, supra note 25, at 20.
39. Id.
40. Since the state has embarked on a sequence of personal income tax cuts, raising
the state tax is an important issue.
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Table 4
Medicaid and Public Assistance
Takeover Options (1991)
($ billions)
Cost/(Savings)
NYS
Other Top PIT Counties
State Takeover Option State NYC Localities Rate(a) Benefitting(b)
100% Medicaid
100% Public Assistance $3.6 $(2.5) $(1.1) 9.7% 17 of 57
100% Medicaid $2.5 $(1.8) $(0.7) 9.2% 14 of 57
50% Medicaid in NYC,
100% Medicaid in other
counties, 100% Public
Assistance, all counties $2.7 $(1.6) $(1.1) 9.3% 18 of 57
25% Medicaid in NYC,
100% Medicaid in other
counties, 100% Public
Assistance, all counties $2.2 $(1.1) $(1.1) 9.0% 36 of 57
100% Public Assistance,
all counties $1.1 $(0.7) $(0.4) 8.4% 18 of 57
Notes: (a) The current top PIT rate is 7.875%.
(b) A county is defined as benefitting if its savings from the takeover exceed additional state
PIT payments made by its residents.
A full takeover of Medicaid and welfare appears not to be a
political winner, since it would benefit only seventeen of the state's
fifty-seven counties. However, a state pick-up of twenty-five percent
of New York City Medicaid costs and one-hundred percent of the
Medicaid costs of other counties, as well as a full takeover of public
assistance costs, would benefit thirty-six of fifty-seven counties - a
substantial majority. New York City would still save more than $1.1
billion. If the city chose to reduce its own PIT by the amount that
city residents pay for the additional state income tax burden ($770
million), i.e., hold city residents harmless for the tax increase, there
would still be a net New York City budget savings of $330 million. In
this scenario, the top state income tax rate would be nine percent -
higher than the present rate of 7.875 percent, but lower than
California's ten percent rate and lower than the top state rate in effect
as recently as 1986.
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V. Conclusion
The thesis of this paper has been that only a thorough restructuring
of "Fiscal Federalism" can yield the kind of budgetary relief that will
allow New York City to improve services or reduce taxes, and that in
doing so our state and nation will be better off. Unfortunately, the
present distribution of taxation and spending in New York State cre-
ates a calculus of "winners and losers" which must be addressed. The
legacy of inadequate "Fiscal Federalism" in New York State works as
a huge barrier to the creation of a more rational and equitable sharing
of fiscal burdens. The time has come to address that legacy and the
unfair burden it has created. Governor Cuomo's Medicaid takeover
proposal is a step in the right direction. However, more can be done.
New York State must work together with New York City to fashion a
bold new approach to allow "Fiscal Federalism" to became an effec-
tive and efficient reality.
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Appendix A
Figure 1
NYC REVENUES
FY 1992 FORECAST
TOTAL: $28,661 MILLION
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TAX COLLECTIONS 59%
$16,879
STATE GRANTS 18%
$5,231
TRANS CAP FUND 1
$2 21
STATE/FED AID 3%
$927
MISC REVENUES 8%
$2,380
FEDERAL GRANTS 11%
$3,042
8ouroe; City of New Ybrk Executive Budget, FY 1992.
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Figure 2
NYC TAX COLLECTIONS
FY 1992 FORECAST
TOTAL: $16,879 MILLION
PROPERTY 46%
$7,824
PERSONAL INCOME 18%
$3,066
SALES 14%
$2,410
OTHER 6%
- $1,021
M COMMERICAL RENT 4%
$750
BUSINESS INCOME 11%
$1,808
Source; City of New Ybrk Executive Budget, FY 1992.
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